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Abstract
I present some evidence showing that the advanced economies’ banks were contributing
in spreading the Euro-crisis to the emerging economies. For this purpose, I test the common
lender channel among other channels of contagion, by using international banking flows data.
Based on a constructed crisis-index for the Euro area, I find that countries with higher level of
exposure to GIIPS, deleveraged more in riskier periods, i.e. during periods with high crisis-
index. Among all emerging economies in our sample, the Latin American countries were not
affected as much as the emerging economies Asia and Europe, despite their high exposures to
Spain. While the impact of the Euro-crisis stopped to show sign in Asia after 2011, it continued
to affect the emerging Europe. The Euro-area banks were deleveraging more in the Emerging
Europe than their peers in non-Euro advanced economies, whereas most of their deleveraging
in Asia happened in 2010. Although the results present evidence in favour of local impacts of
the Euro-crisis, they show the importance of spillover through multinational banks.
Keywords: Sovereign risk, Contagion, euro crisis, emerging economies
JEL Classification: H63, F34, G15
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1 Introduction
Without having completely recovered from the US subprime crisis, the world has plunged into
a new crisis, coming this time from the old continent. The global effect of the Euro crisis has
not been as pervasive as the US crisis. However, markets set alarm bells for Italy and Spain
since the beginning of the crisis. Financial markets follow carefully the situation in Italy with
its huge debt and keep an eye on Spain with its wrecked financial system and weak economy.
In order to fight the crisis, many governments had to pursue unprecedented austerity measures.
Nevertheless, the crisis intensified in the second quarter of 2011 and the ECB was required to
intervene in many fronts such as unlimited bond buys and offering cheap loans to banks called
Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTRO).
The consequences of the Euro crisis reached far beyond the boundaries of the Eurozone.
Although the spillover effect, overall, was not as severe as the subprime crisis, the global bank-
ing system showed vulnerabilities stemming from their exposures to their European counter-
part banks. Some of the emerging economies such as the eastern Europeans are specially more
insecure because of their high exposure to their western counterparts.
This paper tries to draw a picture of international banking lending during the Euro crisis.
The main goal is to discover the role of common bank lenders in propagating the Eurozone
crisis to other regions in the world. More precisely, we test whether banks with higher expo-
sure to Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain (GIIPS) were deleveraging more in emerging
economies during the Euro-crisis. One issue that may arise here, is to disentangle delever-
aging due to the global crisis from deleveraging due to the Euro-crisis. For this purpose, I
use a difference-in-difference approach by serving non-Euro area banks as the control group.
The hypothesis is that, during the global crisis all banks were affected whereas during the
Euro-crisis, banks in the Euro-area were more involved. Another problem is that we should
isolate the loan demand shock from loan supply shock in our identification strategy. For this
issue, joint fixed-effect (lender-borrower) are used to control for non-time variant components
of lender/borrower bilateral relationship. Besides, I assume that unlike the global crisis that
affected the whole world to some degrees, the Euro-crisis was contained inside the Eurozone
mainly. Moreover, it is assumed that emerging countries have access to different sources for
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the same type of funding and therefore any demand driven shocks should not affect the identi-
fication of the supply channel.
While a number of authors examine spillover effects of the Euro-crisis on emerging mar-
kets, the use of banking flows and common lender channel is new. I first look at the usual
factors, cited in the literature, on international banking flows. The results reveal that, many
macroeconomic variables as forces responsible for international flows were not anymore the
main factors behind the variations of flows after the subprime crisis. Contrary to Latin Amer-
ica, common lender channel exists in the Asian and the emerging European countries during all
the years following the global crisis. However, the common lender channel stopped showing
signs for Asia in 2012 while the emerging Europe continued to be affected.
Furthermore, when the lender countries into Euro area and non-Euro area lenders, we ob-
serve a general deleveraging in emerging economies in 2008 and 2009 whereas Eurozone
lenders continued to deleverage through 2010 and 2011. In Asia, the Euro area banks delever-
aged more than their non-Euro area peers in 2010 while in the emerging Europe, the delever-
aging by the Euro area banks were more pronounced.
During the last 25 years, many studies offered some explanations to clarify different mech-
anisms in international transmission of shocks. Before the Asian crisis, many studies had
focused on direct links such as trade and FDI. This is called the income effect. More recent
studies try to explain the transmission of shocks through financial channels. This strand of
literature started mainly by the work of Krugman (1996) who argued that the financial tur-
moil can start from speculative attacks on pegged currencies when the government continues
to follow its expansionary fiscal policy. More advanced versions of the this model included
self-fulfilling crisis and herding behaviours.
Another class of models are based on “wake-up call” line of reasoning. In these models,
a financial turmoil in one country acts as a wake-up call for international investors. Crisis
shifts investors’ perceptions for other country’s financial and macroeconomic fundamentals
which ultimately leads to an outflow from emerging countries. Since this type of spillover is
not caused by economic fundamentals, it is often called “pure contagion” as it is suggested by
Masson (1998). However, the main critic toward the self-fulfilling crisis and wake-up call is
that in these models the source of the change in investor’s expectation is not specified.
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“Common lender effect” which is the subject of this study, is first suggested by ?. Accord-
ing to this theory, countries that are affected during a crisis are those which depend on the same
lenders as countries from where the crises have originated from. This effect exists because in-
vestors experience a loss on their balance sheets and withdraw from other countries in which
they hold positions. This is different from a wake-up call which is an increase in the investors’
degree of risk aversion. The reasons why common lenders withdraw their funds are multiple
and it can go from restoring capital adequacy ratio to meet the margin call or liquidity reasons.
Many authors such as Schinasi and Smith (1999) showed that asset returns in the ground zero
crisis country and the affected country are positively correlated. This suggests that different
countries that share the same lenders, are vulnerable to one another’s shocks.
This paper is in line with the literature on the role of international flows in international
transmission of shocks. Since the seminal work of ? in which they confirm the dominant roles
of financial sector and international bank lending, many studies have been produced in order
to explain different aspects and mechanisms of financial contagion. Cetorelli and Goldberg
(2010) examine the international transmission of shocks on banks’ balance sheet, originating
from advanced economies during the subprime crisis. They isolate loan demand from loan
supply shocks by using fixed effects for borrower countries which would absorb any demand
driven shocks. Authors consider three types of lending: cross-border loans, local claims by
foreign-owned banks, and loans by domestically-owned banks and they find the presence of
supply shocks through all three channels to developing countries.
Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2003) are among the first who introduced a common lender
channel explicitly in the analysis. They look at the Mexican, Asian and Russian crisis and find
an active common lender channel in the Mexican and Asian crisis. Herrero and Martinez Peria
(2007) also analysed the determinants of bank lending by separating local and cross-border
claims and conclude that bank flows are more stable through branches and subsidiaries than
cross-border lending. Thus bank filial reduce their lending less than domestic bank lending
when a financial crisis occurs.
More recently, Aizenman et al. (2012) assess empirically contagion from the Eurozone
countries to developing countries and emerging markets via the equity and bond markets.
Based on an event study, abnormal return variations in the stock and bond markets in emerging
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economies against the Eurozone news is used as a proxy for contagion effects. While au-
thors confirm a contagion from advanced economies to developing countries during the global
depression, they find a mixed picture on the existence and magnitude of contagion from the
Eurozone countries to emerging economies.
Another strand of literature have focused on the external and internal factors of interna-
tional capital flows. For example, Fiess (2003) used principal component analysis in order to
disentangle global factors of international capital flow from country-specific factors. These
factors are then used as explanatory variables to explain capital inflows in Argentina, Brazil,
Mexico and Venezuela. The author finds strong evidence that country specific (pull) factors
are important in the pattern of observed capital flows. However, global (push) factors are only
important in Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela. Overall, the persistence and pattern of the impact
of these factors vary across time and countries.
In the line with pull and push factors, Ghosh et al. (2012) use some additional variables for
bilateral factors and control for financial interconnectedness between lenders and borrowers.
Surprisingly, they find that the emerging Europe to be a more stable region after the global fi-
nancial crisis. This is because, concentration of investors’ portfolios in EU10 or EU candidate
borrower country is not a disincentive for lending. This results does not hold for other regions
in the exercise. The results of this paper accord with the result of Hermann and Mihaljek
(2010) in which a gravity model is used to explain international capital flows from advanced
to emerging economies. The authors deduce that the reduction in capital flows to emerging
Europe was limited during the global recession of 2007-2008. Portes and Rey (2005) also use
a gravity model to explain international transaction in equity flows. They deduce that infor-
mation frictions play an important role in determining the pattern of cross-border transactions.
Moreover, Papaioannou (2009) shows the relationship between institution quality and banking
flows.
Banks are responsible for international transmission of shocks through many channels. In
general, banks rely on different sources of funds such as local deposits as well as external funds
coming from other countries. They can also rely on internal funds financed by subsidiaries and
branches. In order to explain the mechanism through which banks transfer shocks internation-
ally, assume a global bank with foreign affiliate subsidiaries and branches. Divided into two
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Domestic Parent Bank Foreign Branchs or Subsidaries
Assets Liabilities
Liquid Assets
Loans
Domestic loans
Cross-border loans
Deposit
Capital
Other funds
Assets Liabilities
Liquid Assets
Loans
Deposit
Capital
Other funds
Local loans to the host country
Internal lending to the parent bank
Figure 1: The red arrows shows the initial shock to the balance sheet and blue ar-
rows show the subsequent reactions. The parent bank decreases its cross-border
loans and it asks for internal lending from its branches and subsidiaries. Conse-
quently, foreign affiliate banks also reduce the volume of their local loans.
parts for the parent bank and the foreign affiliated bank, the balance sheet of such a global
bank is shown in figure 1. The parent bank holds some liquid assets and loans in the asset side
and it holds deposit, capital and other types of funding in the liability side. The balance sheet
of the foreign affiliated bank is similar to the parent bank. The main difference between the
two balance sheets lies in the asset side and in the composition of the loans.
When the domestic bank realises a loss on its assets, three channels activate which result
in a reduction of available fund for loans in the foreign country. First, due to the loss, domestic
bank reduces its direct cross-border exposure or loan supply, second it decreases the amount
of available fund in the cross-border interbank market and third, its foreign affiliates decrease
their lending in the host country. These channels activate if the parent bank cannot raise fund
through other sources. In the case of the Euro crisis, this highlights the role of the ECB and
its plan to recapitalize banks by LTRO. Also as Sbracia and Zaghini (2003) confirmed, a com-
mon lender channel most likely activates, when the ground-zero crisis country is an important
borrower of a specific lender. Besides aforementioned channels, portfolio flows is another im-
portant financial channel for emerging countries. If the crisis lead to a credit crunch, foreign
capital flows will repatriate from emerging countries and challenge the sustainability of the
current account deficit. A drying-up of foreign bank credit would also put downward pressure
on the currencies of countries that rely on foreign capital. This is because they may need to
cut interest rates to stimulate their economies. Moreover, currency depreciation poses serious
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risk for portfolio inflows which are very important for the emerging economies. Weakening
currencies translates into losses on such investment which could slow down or even reverse
portfolio inflows. Also, notice that banks through their off-balance sheet items can have higher
exposures to the crisis country which is often not captured in the data.
In the next section, I present some stylized facts on international capital flows related to the
Euro crisis. In section 3 the methodology and data are discussed in detail and then I present
the results in 4 and finally I conclude.
2 Some facts
During the past decade, the aggregate cross-border claims in the Asia, emerging Europe and
Latin America has been tripled. This shows the importance of banking flows in transferring
risks across countries. In the second quarter of 2008, the exposure of 9 major Eurozone coun-
tries to developing economies reached to more than 2.45 trillion dollars. Only after 6 months,
banks reduced 15% of their exposure. With the Euro-crisis going on, western European banks
again reduced their exposure to developing economies by a magnitude of 12% during the sec-
ond half of 2011. Although international banking flows plunged sharply after the global crisis
in 2008, they have reached and surpassed, in some regions, the pre-crisis levels.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of banking flows to developing economies in each region.
The base quarter on which, flows to each region is normalized to 100 is the third quarter of
2008, just after the Lehman collapse. Figure 2a exhibits the flows for all reporting banks
to each developing region. The level of international claims on developing Asia and Latin
America is far beyond the the pre-crisis level, while claims are stagnated at the same level
for Africa and Middle-east. Aggregate claims on the emerging Europe remains below its pre-
crisis level, during all periods. Panel 2b shows the same graph for the Eurozone reporting
banks. Almost the same patterns repeat for the emerging Europe and Africa and Middle East.
However, the growth in flows toward Asia and Latin America is much lower than the overall
growth from all reporting countries showed in panel 2a. Flows from European banks to these
regions surpassed their pre-crisis levels before the peak of the Euro-crisis and they fell again
until another uprising in late 2012. The fall in foreign claims of reporting banks in developing
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regions between Q2 and Q4 2011 is comparable to the drop of foreign claim between Q2
and Q4 2008. Euro-area banks have deleveraged around US $1.5 trillion during the last two
quarters of 2011.
These graphs suggest that emerging European countries are the most vulnerable economies
to the Euro-crisis and the western European banks are at the heart of this problem. These
countries are affected by many channels such as trade, interbank market, currencies and bond
spreads. For developing economies close to the Eurozone, the Euro-area banks are the main
lenders. If these banks are under pressure to meet better capital-ratio targets, they may choose
to cut lending rather than raising capital. Europe banks’ were owed $3.4 trillion by emerging
economies in our sample of which $1.3 trillion were lent to eastern Europeans in 2011.
The graphs also indicate that deleveraging has not affected all emerging markets at the
same scale for many reasons. One of the reasons is that the Euro-area banks’ share of do-
mestic banking assets was very small in many emerging countries, for example around 10%
in Emerging Asia. Another reason for this heterogeneity is that, depending on whether banks’
business model is conducted by subsidiaries, branches or simply by cross-border flows and
other characteristics of international banking flows, spillover effects vary.
As we will see, the common lender channel is almost always absent in Latin American
countries despite of their high exposure to Spain. Figure 3 presents the deleveraging of all
advanced economies in our sample in each region as a percentage of each lender country’s
total claim in emerging countries between Q2 and Q4 2011. This figure shows that most of
deleveraging in this region has been done, in consolidated banking statistics, by Spanish banks.
The main reason for the absence of common lender channel in Latin America is that Spanish
banks operate in this region mainly though their subsidiaries which focus mainly on retail
banking and their operations are funded principally through the local deposits. Nevertheless,
Spanish banks cut their activities in Latin American countries where they were not viable or
in non-core activities such as pension funds. The other reason is the low exposure of other
advanced economies in this region.
Although, Austrian and Italian banks happen to be the main deleveraging forces in the
emerging Europe, they also have a big retail business in this region. The banks in these
two countries are following their business models, similar to Spanish banks in Latin Amer-
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ica, through their subsidiaries and via local currency funding. German and Dutch banks also
deleveraged significantly in the emerging Europe. However, contrary to Italian and Austrian
banks, overall, they downsized their presence in the Eastern European countries.
In Asia, French, Swiss and Dutch banks reduced their exposures because of funding pres-
sures in the domestic parent banks. Generally speaking, Euro-area banks and on top French
banks have done the most deleveraging in emerging economies. Except Swiss banks, delever-
aging in non-Euro banks were limited and even Japanese banks increased their exposure during
second half of 2011.
3 Methodology and Data:
I use the BIS annual dataset for the international banking flow. The data is organized in 9
advanced creditor countries: Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Japan, UK
and US and it includes 31 emerging countries as debtors. The list of these countries can be
found in table 6. The data is taken from BIS consolidated data. The consolidated data report
all banks’ financial claims on the rest of the world. Thereby it provides a measure for exposure
risk of domestic banking system. BIS also reports "locational banking statistics" which is
different from consolidated data. BIS consolidated banking statistics refer to the aggregate
claims of creditor country banks and not claims by host countries. As a result, exposure of
a bank through its subsidiaries and branches (in the emerging countries for our purpose) is
captured as claims of the original credit bank (US lending to Malaysia through its subsidiaries
in Singapore is counted as US lending). Therefore, banks can change their exposure to the
host country without a one for one relationship in the balance of payment. Each set of these
datasets has its own advantages. The advantage of locational banking statistic is that data are
adjusted for exchange rate movements and it is compatible with balance-of-payment definition.
However, from a common lender point of the view, the consolidated data seems to be a better
choice because it allows us to study how a shock to a specific country banking system can
affects international flows to emerging economies. Another advantage of consolidated data is
that the BIS publicly publishes the aggregate consolidated data on exposure of each country
against other countries and regions.
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An important issue in international lending is the valuation effect. The true value of flows
may not be reflected correctly because of the movement in the exchange rate or change in
the asset price. Flows are underestimated with the depreciation of a country’s currency which
borrows in its own currency. In order to adjust data for exchange rate movements we have
to make a guess on the amount of international lending which is denominated in the local
currency. Assuming claims and the exchange rate at time t0 as I0 and E0 and at time t1 as I1
and E1 respectively, then the real inflows is equal to:
I1 −
(
(1− γ)I0 + γI0
E1
E0
)
Where γ is the fraction of claims, denominated in the local currency. In Van Rijckeghem
and Weder (2003) this share is estimated to be around 20%. They chose the 20% based on the
share of debt securities to total claims and share of local currency denominated bank claims.
The BIS consolidated data only covers the on-balance sheet claims whereas during the
crisis the off-balance sheet data plays an important role, because banks usually use their off-
balance sheet positions to hedge their positions. This is important in cases where banks have
an important exposure to other financial or non-financial entities which have large exposure in
the crisis country (GIIPS in the case of the Euro-crisis).
The dependent variable is the change in the external position of banks in advanced coun-
tries as a share of their total positions. Independent variables are banking exposure to a host
country as a percentage of the creditor country’s total claims and the common lender variable
which is exposure of banks to GIIPS as a percentage of each creditor country’s total claims.
The rest of variables include macro and financial variables which are judged to be important in
the literature of international capital flows. For macroeconomic variables, data from the Inter-
national Monetary Fund’s IFS database, Eurostat and IADB are used. Among other variables,
I use a crisis index which is constructed as follow:
CISS × World Claims on GIIPS
World Claims on Euro Area ×
(
1−
∆World Claims on GIIPS
World Claims on GIIPS
)
× 100 (1)
where CISS stands for “Composite Index of Systemic Stress” in the financial system. This
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index has developed in 2012 by the ECB “to measure the current state of instability, i.e. the
current level of frictions, stresses and strains (or the absence of these) in the financial system
and to condense that state of financial instability into a single statistic.” as it is stated in Holló
et al. (2012). CISS is a combination of 15 mostly market-based financial stress measures that
are classified into five categories, namely the financial intermediaries sector, money markets,
equity markets, bond markets and foreign exchange markets. In order to capture the idea of the
systemic risk, the CISS puts more weight on situations where stress prevails in many market
segments at the same time. Recently, many other Financial Stress Indexes (FSI) have been
developed. We chose CISS, because the subject of this study is the Euro crisis and besides,
the data are publicly available. Equation (1) adjusts CISS for the world deleveraging in GIIPS.
The index includes the weight of these five countries in the Eurozone and it puts more stress in
situations where investors from all over the world withdraw their funds from GIIPS.
Figure 4 shows the crisis index since the year 2000 in quarterly time frequency. The index
captures well the events before and after the global crisis. It reaches its maximum in 2008-
Q4 and remains high during 2009. It increases again in the first quarter of 2010 with the
beginning of the Euro-crisis. The index shows that the hardest periods, during the Euro-crisis
were between the second and fourth quarter of 2011.
Figure 6 traces the growth rate of exposure of all countries in panel 6a and for European
countries in panel 6b against the crisis index. The two graphs seems to be highly and neg-
atively correlated. When deleveraging, i.e. the growth rate of claims reaches its minimum
level, the crisis-index reaches its maximum as well. While the deleveraging for all countries
is comparable with European banks’ deleveraging, during the second half of 2011 European
banks deleveraged more than other reporting banks in the sample.
On the other hand, figure 5 exhibits the average exposure growth rate of each advanced
economy in emerging countries versus their exposure to GIIPS, as a percentage of their total
exposure, during 2011-Q3. It appears that advanced countries with relatively higher exposure
to GIIPS, on average deleveraged more in emerging economies. Figures 6 nad 5 motivate the
use of crisis index and exposure to GIIPS as independent variables and explaining the change
in exposure to emerging economies.
11
4 Results
4.1 Base specification
In this section, I present and discuss the main results. In the literature of international banking
flows, many pull and push factors are often repeated as the main drivers. The first question that
I address here is whether these main pull and push factors are still the main drivers after the
subprime crisis? In order to do so, I run regressions of the form:
∆Exposureijt
Exposureit
= α+ β
Exposureijt
Exposureit
+ ζ
exposure to GIIPSit
Exposureit
+
ηCrisis Indext + λ(exposure to GIIPS)it × Crisis Indext+
+ γ(Macro variables)jt + δij + εijt (2)
where Exposureijt is the exposure of banks in advanced economy (AE) i, in each emerging
country (EME) j at time t. ∆Exposureijt is the change in this variable and exposure to GIIPS
is the exposure of these banks against GIIPS. δij is the country-pair fixed effect. This variable
controls for all time-invariant characteristics of each pair of countries such as geographical
distance, common language, etc. A significant λ means that “common lender/flight to quality”
channel is active during the crisis period. A significant and negative λ captures the effect of
AE banks higher level of exposure to GIIPS during crisis periods on emerging countries.
Table 1 shows the base specification of international banking flows in our panel data. The
exercise is performed for the whole sample period 1999Q4-2012Q4 and then it is repeated for
two sub-periods 1999Q4-2007Q4 and 2008Q1-2012Q4. For each time period the first column
includes macro variables. The sign of exposure in all regressions is positive meaning that
change in exposure is proportional to initial exposure levels.
For example the coefficient of exposure in the first column means that for each additional
percentage point of exposure, flows increase, on average, by 3.88% to that emerging country.
Coefficient for Exposure to GIIPS is positive and significant after the year 2008 and in the
whole sample period when macro variables are not included. This is contrary to our intuition,
but we can interpret its sign only with the help of coefficients for Crisis index and the interac-
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tion term which are negative when they are significant. The positive sign makes sense when
there is no crisis in GIIPS countries. Here, the positive sign means that the total effect of Ex-
posure to GIIPS on ∆Exposure decreases across levels of Crisis index. In other words, having
additional exposure of one percentage point to GIIPS countries in an environment with higher
crisis level has relatively smaller effect on reducing bank exposures in emerging economies.
In the other dimension, the coefficient of Crisis index is negative and also significant. This
implies that the total effect of crisis level increases across levels of exposure to GIIPS. This
means that in high levels of exposure to GIIPS, higher crisis level has bigger negative effect on
the change in exposure.
Among macro variables, real effective exchange rate (REER) and Export growth rate are
significant with expected signs after 2008 and for the whole sample. REER is a useful vari-
able since it takes into account, not only inflation and exchange rate movements, but also, it
includes exchange rate regime and trade competitiveness. In a flexible exchange rate regime,
real appreciation of REER is due to an appreciation of nominal exchange rate and in a fixed
regime, it translates into a rise in inflation. Real appreciation also undermines competitive-
ness. In literature, the positive relationship between REER and capital inflows in emerging
economies are well documented (see for example Calvo et al. (1993)). Current account bal-
ance is the main driver after proportional flows during the pre-crisis period. It is again very
well-known that in the nineties, the outpouring of international capital flows from advanced
economies to emerging countries coincided with the growing current account deficit in these
countries (see Debelle and Galati (2007) for example). It appears that, this pattern continued in
2000s until the starting of the subprime crisis. In the regression with the whole sample, public
debt also emerges with a negative sign which is expected. The R-squared is low for all regres-
sions. However, this is normal in a panel dataset since usually variations across individuals
(here country-pairs) at a given time is bigger than variations across time for a given individual.
This exercise presents some evidence in favour of common lender channel after the year
2008 for advanced countries in the sample. Next, it is interesting to analyse how this channel
contributed in propagating crisis in different regions of the world. For this purpose, I divide the
sample of emerging and developing economies into three regions, namely Asia, Emerging Eu-
rope and Latin America (LA). This time, I focus only on common lender variables since macro
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variables could only marginally explain international capital flows into emerging economies
during and after the subprime crisis.
Table 2 exhibits the results of this exercise by regions. It appears that the Latin America was
not affected neither by the subprime crisis nor by the Euro-crisis. This is surprising knowing
that European banks provide more than 45% of all external flows to Latin America1. This
region is also particularly exposed to Spain and to a lesser extend to France. However the
nature of the parent/subsidiary relationship seems to be more important than the overall claims
by European branches and subsidiaries in the region. One explanation could be that, in Latin
America, local subsidiaries of European banks act as local banks because of their sizes and they
receive deposits in local currencies. Most of loans are then funded by local deposits rather than
wholesale funding which is the case for the emerging Europe.
The common lender variable indicates that Asian countries are as vulnerable as the emerg-
ing Europe to the Euro-crisis. In general, Asian banks like Latin America have a large share of
their liabilities made up of deposits and their reliance on wholesale funding is low. Neverthe-
less, Korean banks are very depending on wholesale funding and are more exposed to global
market volatility. Other countries, such as Hong Kong and Singapore are financial centres and
are most likely to squeeze in capital markets by European banks’ withdrawal. The coefficient
for exposure is highest for the Emerging Europe before the global crisis. This is because except
few countries, western European banks control more than half of the banking system in emerg-
ing European countries. This makes them particularly vulnerable to the crisis in the west. As
mentioned before, the Emerging Europe is particularly reliant on the wholesale funding .
4.2 When were common lender channels active?
Banking flows are very volatile and sensitive to overall market sentiment. This means that the
pattern of flows can change direction from one quarter of year to another. While the common
lender channel for the post-Lehman periods in Asia and the emerging Europe was active, it
captured only an average effect during this period. Particularly, we have not distinguished
between the Lehman crisis and the Euro-crisis which started in 2010. For this reason, we are
interested in knowing in which years emerging countries were affected the most through the
1BIS locational banking statistics, 2011Q2
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common lender channel. For this purpose, I replaced the Crisis Index by year dummies and
each year-dummy is interacted with the exposure to GIIPS.
The results are exhibited in table 3. Again, the exercise is repeated for each region and for
the whole sample of emerging countries. The base year is 2007. As it is expected (according to
previous results), Latin America is not affected by the global crisis or the Euro-crisis. Besides
possible explanation mentioned above, Latin America enjoyed a relatively high growth rate
during these years (around 4% since 2011). Also, local institutions are gradually becoming
more and more active within the region and less dependent to western fund sources. Low level
of debt is another reason for which, Latin America has not been touched so much. While
the region was struggling with the debt problem for more than 2 decades, Latin America has
recovered and turned the boat around after the Argentina’s crisis. The average debt-to-GDP of
Latin America is around 40% which is much lower than the debt level of advanced economies
in our sample. All these factors are promising and present some solid opportunities for western
banks.
Asia and Emerging Europe were affected after the Lehman and Euro crises. For instance
in 2010, every additional percentage point of exposure to GIIPS (as the total claims of lender
countries) implies 0.23% of deleveraging in Asia with respect to the base year which is 2007. It
seems that the global crisis and Euro crisis stopped to show their effect in 2012 in Asia whereas
the process of deleveraging continued through 2012 for the Emerging Europe. The coefficients
of interaction terms are all significant after the Lehman crisis for Asia and Emerging Europe.
However, the magnitude of coefficients after the Euro crisis (from 2010 onwards) is bigger
which points to the higher impact of common lender channel in the process of deleveraging.
4.3 Have lender countries in the Euro Area been deleveraging more?
A difference-in-difference approach
The results presented until here show an active common lender channel for Asia and Emerging
Europe after 2008. Nevertheless, results are the mixed for Euro area and non-Euro area lender
countries. Table 4 shows the results when a Euro area dummy is included in the regression.
The main question here is whether Euro-area banks have been subjected to more deleveraging
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with respect to other advanced economies banks? For this purpose, the non-Euro area banks
are served as the control group and we estimate the following equation:
∆Exposureijt = α+ β(Exposure)ijt + ζ(exposure to GIIPS)it
+ δE1Euro + δyear1Year + δE,year1Euro × 1Year (3)
The coefficients of interest are δE,year. Here the base year is again 2007. These coefficients
represent the difference between Euro area and non-Euro area banks in each year with respect
to 2007, directly in percentage point.
In all sample countries, we observe a general deleveraging during 2008 and 2009, where
as the process of deleveraging continued for Euro area lender countries through 2010 and
2011. For Asia this coefficient is only significant in 2010 and for the emerging Europe all
coefficients are significant. For instance in Asia in 2010, the Euro-area countries’ banks have
reduced 3.38% more their exposure, comparing to non-Euro area banks. Emerging Europe
showed more vulnerable to Euro area banks during all the post-Lehman years. This is because
the main creditor of these countries were western European banks. However, the coefficient in
2010 is the biggest and the most significant.
In order to get a better image and exact date of these effects, I construct a panel whose
dimensions are lender and borrower countries. By ruling out the time dimension, we get a
more accurate estimation not only for the common lender channel but also of the timing of the
common lender channel. Before the end of 2009, all deleveraging was related to the global
crisis. Only in December 2009, the Euro-crisis gradually appeared and it did not really affect
the market until May 2010. Because of this natural experiment, we put that European banks
are affected more by the Euro-crisis comparing to their peers in other advanced countries. So
we estimate equation 3 for two specific quarters.
First sub-table in table 5 is the result of the estimation for all countries in the sample. The
coefficients of interest are again coefficients for the difference-in-difference term. The results
exhibits a significant extra-deleveraging for European banks with respect to other advanced
economies’ banks in all tested sub-periods. For example in 2011 Q3 during the height of the
Euro-crisis, European banks deleveraging on average was 5.04 percentage point more than
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other AE banks during the Euro-crisis with respect to the global crisis. The common lender
channel is present in sub-periods when the coefficient for Exposure is positive.
The second sub-table shows the result for Asia. In this region, the coefficients of interest are
significant only for the first quarter of 2009. Put differently, there is no significant difference
in deleveraging between Euro and non-Euro banks in 2009 Q2 and 2011 Q3-Q4. This is in
contrast with the results of Emerging Europe presented in the next sub-table. Contrary to Asia,
in Emerging Europe, probably most of the deleveraging related to the global crisis happened
in the first quarter of 2009. Therefore in 2011 Q3 and Q4, Euro-area banks respectively had
in average 3.75 and 4.44 percentage point more capital outflows comparing to non-Euro area
banks with respect to the second quarter of 2009.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I analysed the spillover effects of the Euro-crisis on emerging economies through
international banking flows. I focused on the common lender channel of spillover among many
other identified channels of contagion. For this purpose, the BIS consolidated data are used
to capture deleveraging done by subsidiaries and branches for each advanced economy in our
sample. A crisis-index based on the Composite Index of Systemic Stress (CISS) and exposure
to GIIPS is also developed.
The usual pull and push factors discovered in the literature do not seem to be anymore
responsible for international banking flows after the global crisis. Instead, the common lender
channel, except for the Latin America was present during the post-crisis period in Asia and
emerging Europe. Two main reasons could potentially explain the absence of common lender
channel in Latin America: Firstly, the major foreign creditors in this region are Spanish banks.
However, these banks operate principally through their subsidiaries and branches by local de-
posit funding. Secondly, their exposures to other advanced economies is very small.
Emerging Europe is the region which was hit the most and it has not been recovered to its
pre-crisis period in terms of western banking flows. Many of main creditors of this region such
as Italy, Austria and Germany have enormously deleveraged after the global crisis and during
the Euro-crisis. Some of these banks, mostly in Italy and Austria changed their business model
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from wholesale funding to retail banking.
Asian emerging economies were not spared from the spillover effects of the Euro-crisis
either. Although the spillover effects were limited, I found that the common lender channel
was present at least during the periods after the beginning of the Euro-crisis. French, Swiss,
Dutch and American banks were all deleveraging during the peak of the Euro crisis while
Japanese increased their exposure in the same period. In general, it is apparent that regional
banks, from both emerging and advanced economies, have increased their shares in funding
regional borrowers since the global crisis. This is specially true for Asia and Latin America.
In estimating banks’ balance sheet shocks, we had to disentangle the effect of demand from
supply shocks. Moreover, we had to distinguish between deleveraging due to the global crisis
from deleveraging due to the Euro-crisis. I overcome these issues by using a difference-in-
difference approach. Euro area banks have been deleveraging more during the Euro-crisis than
their peers in the Japan, Switzerland, UK and US, naturally because of their higher exposure
to GIIPS and sharing the same currency as the ground-zero crisis countries.
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Appendix
Figure 2: Evolution of bank claims’ on each developing economies. Claims are
normalized to 100 in 2008-Q3.
(a) All reporting banks
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Figure 3: Deleveraging of all advanced economies in our sample in each region as a percentage of each coun-
try’s total claim in emerging countries between Q2 and Q4 2011.
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Figure 4: The figure shows the crisis index since the year 2000 in quarterly
time frequency. The crisis index is constructed according to equation (1). The
Composite Index of Systemic Stress (CISS), used in the construction of the cri-
sis index, is an indicator developed by the ECB which is a combination of 15
mostly market-based financial stress measures. The crisis-index captures well
the events before and after the global crisis. It reaches its maximum in 2008-
Q4 and remains high during 2009. It increases again in the first quarter of 2010
with the beginning of the Euro-crisis. The index shows that the hardest periods,
during the Euro-crisis were between second and fourth quarter of 2011.
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Figure 5: average exposure growth rate of each advanced economy in emerging
countries versus their exposure to GIIPS, as a percentage of their total exposure,
during 2011-Q3. The slope of the fitted-line is -0.0017, the intercept is -0.00018
and the R-squared is 0.396. This means that on average, for each extra percentage
exposure to GIIPS, the exposure to emerging countries decreases with a rate of
0.17%
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Figure 6: Growth rate of exposure to emerging economies vs the crisis-index
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1999-2012 1999-2007 2008-2012
Variables 1 2 1 2 1 2
Exposure (% total) 0.0388∗∗∗ 0.0509∗∗∗ 0.1172∗∗∗ 0.0336∗∗∗ 0.0466∗∗∗ 0.0461∗∗∗
(0.0078) (0.003) (0.0125) (0.005) (0.0160) (0.0087)
Exposure to GIIPS (% total) 0.0010 0.0015∗ -0.0000 0.0016 0.0083∗∗∗ 0.0060∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0025) (0.0015)
Crisis index -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0009 -0.0006 −0.0015∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0020) (0.0007) (0.0004)
Exposure to GIIPS×Crisis Index −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗ -0.0000 0.0000 −1.27e− 4∗∗ −0.0001∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0002) (5.06e− 5) (0.0000)
Interest rate differetials 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0006
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0018)
Real effective exchange rate 0.0006∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0010∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004)
Current account balance (% GDP) -0.0001 −0.0005∗∗ 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Public deficit (%GDP) -0.0002 (-0.0006) 0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Public debt (% GDP) −0.0004∗ 0.0001 -0.0002
(0.0002) 0.0003 0.0005
GDP growth rate 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0001
(0.0001) 0.0001 0.0002
Export growth rate 0.0005∗∗ -0.0001 8.13e− 4∗∗
(0.0002) 0.0002 (3.94e− 04)
Observations 14310 16960 8910 10560 5400 6400
Adj. R-Squared 0.0370 0.0237 0.0715 0.0059 0.0606 0.0154
Table 1: Robust standard errors in between parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical sig-
nificance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level by (***), (**) and (*) respectively. The dependent
variable is the change in advanced economies banks’ exposure to emerging countries as
a percentage of their total exposure to the world. The panel unit is the joint advanced-
emerging economies and joint fixed effect is applied.
The results in this table show that most of the identified macro pull and push factors in the
literature are not responsible for international capital flows during and after the subprime
crisis.
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1999-2012 1999-2007 2007-2012
Variables Asia Europe EME LA Asia Europe EME LA Asia Europe EME LA
Exposure (%
total) 0.0226
∗∗∗ 0.0484∗∗∗ 0.0529∗∗∗ 0.0112 0.1235∗∗∗ 0.0368∗∗∗ 0.1577∗∗∗ 0.0608∗∗∗ 0.0325∗∗∗
(0.0062) (0.0047) (0.0055) (0.0090) (0.0095) (0.0113) (0.0143) (0.0094) (0.0110)
Exposure to
GIIPS (% total) 0.0025
∗∗∗ 0.0011∗∗ 0.0002 0.0017 0.0007 -0.0024 0.0099∗∗∗ 0.0060∗∗∗ 0.0061∗
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0027) 0.0014 (0.0007) (0.0063) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0034)
Crisis index -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0009 −0.0065∗∗∗ -0.0013 0.0006 −0.0015∗∗∗ −0.0006∗ -0.0014
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0013) 0.0024 (0.0011) (0.0106) 0.0004 (0.0003 ) (0.0011)
Exposure to
GIIPS×Crisis
Index
−6.91e− 05∗∗ −8.64e− 05∗∗∗ -1.89e-05 0.0002 -9.00e-05 -0.0012 −1.00e− 04∗∗∗ −1.11e− 04∗∗∗ -8.63e-05
(2.76e-05) (1.7973e-05) (1.0921e-04) 0.0002 (1.08e-04) (0.0010) 3.19e-05 (2.81e-05) 9.45e-05
Observations 5300 6360 4770 2900 3480 2610 2400 2880 2160
Adj. R-Squared 0.0124 0.0312 0.0253 0.0101 0.0666 0.0061 0.1103 0.0445 0.0113
Table 2: Robust standard errors in between parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level by (***), (**) and (*) respectively. The dependent variable is the change in advanced economies banks’ exposure
to emerging countries as a percentage of their total exposure to the world. The panel unit is the joint advanced-emerging
economies and joint fixed effect is applied.
The common lender channel is investigated across, Asian, European and Latin American emerging countries. The common
lender variable is significant for the whole sample for Asia and Emerging Europe. The same pattern repeats for the periods
after the year 2007. Before the global crisis, the channel does not act and only proportional flow (exposure) is significant. In
other words, if we withdraw data after the subprime crisis from the whole sample, the common lender channel disappears.
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Variables All regions Asia EME Europe LA
Exposure (% total) 0.0451∗∗∗ 0.1721∗∗∗ 0.0648∗∗∗ 0.0326∗∗∗
(0.0048) (0.0149) (0.0097) (0.0110)
Exposure to GIIPS (% total) 0.0042∗∗ 0.0077∗∗∗ 0.0071∗∗∗ 0.0001
(0.0017) (0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0063)
12008 -0.0108 −0.0258∗∗∗ (0.0033) -0.0190
(0.0090) (0.0098) 0.0082 (0.0281)
12009 -0.0069 -0.0099 -0.0047 -0.0075
(0.0090) (0.0098) (0.0081) (0.0281)
12010 0.0073 0.0061 0.0111 -0.0007
(0.0093) (0.0100 ) (0.0083) (0.0288)
12011 -0.0030 -0.0070 0.0172∗∗ -0.0169
(0.0093) (0.0101 ) (0.0083) (0.0289)
12012 -0.0006 -0.0159 0.0144∗ -0.0194
(0.0009) (0.0103) 0.0085 (0.0294)
Exposure to GIIPS ×12008 −0.0017∗∗ −0.0014∗ −0.0024∗∗∗ -0.0013
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0022)
Exposure to GIIPS ×12009 −0.0015∗∗ −0.0017∗∗ −0.0025∗∗∗ -0.0007
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0023)
Exposure to GIIPS ×12010 −0.0020∗∗∗ −0.0023∗∗∗ −0.0029∗∗∗ -0.0010
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0023)
Exposure to GIIPS ×12011 −0.0019∗∗ −0.0023∗∗∗ −0.0026∗∗∗ -0.0011
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0024)
Exposure to GIIPS ×12012 -0.0006 0.0004 −0.0017∗∗ -0.0007
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0027)
Observations 7680 2400 2880 2160
Adj. R-Squared 0.0147 0.0960 0.0392 0.0080
Table 3: Robust standard errors in between parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level by (***), (**) and (*) respectively. The
dependent variable is the change in advanced economies banks’ exposure to emerging
countries as a percentage of their total exposure to the world. The panel unit is the joint
advanced-emerging economies and joint fixed effect is applied.
The table presents common lender channel from a time perspective. Instead of using
variable crisis index, we wanted to see the effect of global crisis and Euro-crisis sepa-
rately by year dummies. The results show that the common lender channel was active
in all regions except in the Latin America
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Variables All regions Asia EME Europe LA
Exposure (% total) 0.0444∗∗∗ 0.1740∗∗∗ 0.0636∗∗∗ 0.0330∗∗∗
(0.0060) (0.0151) (0.0098) (0.0110)
Exposure to GIIPS (% total) 0.0024 0.0065∗∗∗ 0.0039∗∗ -0.0015
(0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0016) (0.0052)
12008 −0.0185
∗∗
−0.0373∗∗∗ -0.0113 -0.0126
(0.0078) (0.0082) (0.0071) (0.0251)
12009 −0.0147
∗
−0.0198∗∗ −0.0193∗∗∗ -0.0042
(0.0078) (0.0082) (0.0071) (0.0252)
12010 0.0018 0.0025 -0.0017 0.0003
(0.0083) (0.0088) (0.0075) (0.0265)
12011 -0.0052 −0.0228∗∗ 0.0010 -0.0089
(0.0085 ) (0.0091) (0.0077) (0.0271)
12012 -0.0051 −0.0237∗∗ 0.0042 -0.0128
(0.0088) (0.0094) (0.0079) (0.0279)
1Euro × 12008 -0.0167 -0.0061 −0.0165∗ -0.0319
(0.0103) (0.0109) (0.0096) (0.0321)
1Euro × 12009 -0.0131 -0.0148 −0.0181∗ -0.0163
(0.0105) (0.0111) (0.0097) ( 0.0326)
1Euro × 12010 −0.0258
∗∗
−0.0338∗∗∗ −0.0295∗∗∗ -0.0198
(0.0104) 0.0109 (0.0096) (0.0323)
1Euro × 12011 −0.0214
∗∗
-0.0104 −0.0195∗∗ -0.0333
(0.0103) (0.0108) (0.0097) (0.0320)
1Euro × 12012 -0.0135 0.0113 −0.0192∗ -0.0273
(0.0106) (0.0111) (0.0100) (0.0326)
Observations 7680 2400 2880 2160
Adj. R-Squared 0.0149 0.1010 0.0352 0.0091
Table 4: Robust standard errors in between parentheses. Asterisks indicate statis-
tical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level by (***), (**) and (*) respectively.
The dependent variable is the change in advanced economies banks’ exposure to
emerging countries as a percentage of their total exposure to the world. The panel
unit is the joint advanced-emerging economies and joint fixed effect is applied.
The table shows the difference-in-difference estimation with respect to the base
year 2007. It appears that the European banks have deleveraged more with respect
to non-Euro area banks, during all the post-crisis periods in emerging European
countries, while the deleveraging in Asia mostly have been done in 2010.
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Variables 2009Q1-2011Q3 2009Q1-2011Q4 2009Q2-2011Q3 2009Q2-2011Q4
Exposure (% total) −0.0752∗∗∗ 0.0064∗∗ −0.0352∗∗∗ 0.0439∗∗∗
(0.0042) (0.0025) (0.0059) (0.0032)
Exposure to GIIPS (% total) -0.0004 −0.0021∗∗∗ 0.0002 −0.0015∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0011) (0.0006)
1Euro 0.0259
∗∗ 0.0240∗∗∗ 0.0182 0.0172
(0.0145) (0.0090) (0.0203) (0.0115)
12011 0.0149 0.0025 -0.0135 −0.0257∗∗
(0.0129) (0.0080) (0.0180) (0.0102)
1Euro × 12011 −0.0421
∗∗
−0.0210∗∗ −0.0504∗∗ −0.0297∗∗
(0.0169) (0.0104) (0.0236) (0.0134)
Constant -0.0012 -0.0070 0.0170 0.0117
(0.0098) (0.0061) (0.0138) (0.0078)
Observations 640 640 640 640
Adj. R-Squared 0.3870 0.04336 0.0925 0.2981
Variables 2009Q1-2011Q3 2009Q1-2011Q4 2009Q2-2011Q3 2009Q2-2011Q4
Exposure (% total) -0.0086 −0.0802∗∗∗ 0.0480∗∗∗ −0.0189∗
(0.0105) (0.0083) (0.0102) (0.0109)
Exposure to GIIPS (% total) −0.0022∗∗ -0.0010 −0.0022∗∗ -0.0010
(0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0010)
1Euro 0.0456
∗∗ 0.0263∗ 0.0072 -0.0120
(0.0175) (0.0134) (0.0172) (0.0179)
12011 0.0387
∗∗ 0.0141 −0.0367∗∗ −0.0613∗∗∗
(0.0151) (0.0115) (0.0148) (0.0154)
1Euro × 12011 −0.0653
∗∗∗
−0.0442∗∗∗ -0.0157 0.0056
(0.0195) (0.0149) (0.0192) (0.0199)
Constant −0.0211∗ -0.0002 0.0244∗∗ 0.0444∗∗∗
(0.0118) (0.0090) (0.0116) (0.0121)
Observations 200 200 200 200
Adj. R-Squared 0.07311 0.4194 0.2173 0.1897
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Variables 2009Q1-2011Q3 2009Q1-2011Q4 2009Q2-2011Q3 2009Q2-2011Q4
Exposure (% total) −0.0654∗∗∗ −0.0728∗∗∗ -0.0055 -0.0141
(0.0117) (0.0104) (0.0121) (0.0113)
Exposure to GIIPS (% total) 0.0003 -0.0008 0.0009 -0.0001
(0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009)
1Euro -0.0055 0.0067 0.0097 0.0149
(0.0150) (0.0135) (0.0158) (1.4657)
12011 0.0043 0.0039 -0.0023 -0.0028
(0.0131) (0.0118) (0.0139) (0.0131)
1Euro × 12011 0.0031 -0.0034 −0.0375∗∗ −0.0444∗∗
(0.0177) (0.0159) (0.0186) (0.0176)
Constant -0.0049 0.0004 -0.0029 0.0025
(0.0100) (0.0090) (0.0105) (0.0100)
Observations 240 240 240 240
Adj. R-Squared 0.1433 0.2393 0.0414 0.0669
Table 5: Robust standard errors in between parentheses. Asterisks indicate statis-
tical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level by (***), (**) and (*) respectively.
The dependent variable is the change in advanced economies banks’ exposure to
emerging countries as a percentage of their total exposure to the world. The panel
unit is the joint advanced-emerging economies and joint fixed effect is applied.
The first sub-table shows the result for the whole emerging economies in our
sample, the second sub-table is for Asian countries and the third one is for the
emerging European countries. Here, we exclude the time dimension to focus on
two sub-periods during which, banks where under deleveraging pressures. The
result in the first sub-table states a significant extra-deleveraging for European
banks with respect to other advanced economies’ banks in all tested sub-periods.
In the second sub-table, the coefficients of interest are only significant for the first
quarter of 2009. In other words, there is no significant difference in deleverag-
ing between Euro and non-Euro banks in 2009 Q2 and 2011 Q3-Q4. This is in
contrast with the results of Emerging Europe presented in the next sub-table.
31
Advanced Countries Developing Europe Developing Latin America & Caribbean Developing Asia & Pacific Developing Africa & Middle East
Austria Bulgaria Argentina China Morocco
France Croatia Brazil India South Africa
Germany Czech Republic Chile Indonesia Qatar
Italy Hungary Colombia Malaysia United Arab Emirates
Japan Poland Ecuador Thailand
Netherlands Romania Mexico South Korea
Spain Russia Peru Singapour
Switzerland Latvia Uruguay Vietnam
United Kingdom Lituenia Venezuela Hong Kong
United States Serbia
Ukraine
Table 6: List of Advanced and Emerging countries in our sample
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